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from Gainesville, Florida Hello, I'm Mike Gannon, and this is conversation. Fall of 1982 marks the 20th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis that fall of 1962 when the Soviet Union deployed ballistic missiles in Cuba capable of carrying nuclear weapons too many points of the United States.

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It was resolved by means, which are still controverted. President John F. Kennedy was the principal architect of the policy that eventually led to the withdrawal of those ballistic missiles. His brother, Robert Kennedy, was attorney general and a member of the small group of advisers to the president, who made the determination what would be the American response to this provocation.

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Some years after 1962 Bobby Kennedy, as he popularly was known, wrote a book entitled 13 Days. The opening two paragraphs read This Way on Tuesday morning, October 16 1962. Shortly after nine o'clock, President Kennedy called and asked me to come to the White House. He said only that we were facing great trouble.

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Shortly afterwards, in his office, he told me that a U two reconnaissance plane had just finished a photographic mission and that the intelligence community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba. That was the beginning. Bobby Kennedy continues of the Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation between the two giant atomic nations, the U.

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S. A. And the U. S. S R, which brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind. From that moment in President Kennedy's office until Sunday morning, October 28 that was my life. And for Americans and Russians for the whole world, it was their life as well.

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There are at least four questions that might be asked in remembering that crisis and its resolution, they might be stated as follows. How close did we actually come to a nuclear catastrophe? Why did the Russians risk so much? What was their ultimate purpose? And why did they withdraw these four questions and others will occupy us on this conversation.

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When I return in a moment, Live Live presents conversation from the University of Florida, a discussion of social, political, scientific and religious issues of the day. Your host is Dr Michael Vegan in professor of history and ethics and assistant dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Florida.

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My guest on this conversation is Dr Robert J. McMahon, professor of diplomatic history in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences of the University of Florida. Bob, Welcome to conversations. Thanks. My glad to be here. Well, it's been 20 years, and the opening paragraphs of Bobby Kennedy's book, which I read, introduce us to 13 days of extraordinary crisis in the United States, a crisis felt around the world.

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I don't know where you were at that particular time. I happened to have been in Rome attending the first and opening session of the Vatican Council. And all of this came to me through screaming headlines in the Italian press and somewhat later from The New York Herald Tribune, the Paris edition.

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I suppose that here in the United States, as you watch the television accounts, listen to the radio and read the papers, it was very much a nationally felt crisis. Is that correct? I think very much so. Although, uh, as 1/7 grader, I can't say that my political consciousness was at the point where I was very aware of what was going on at the time.

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I do remember distinctly the feeling on the part of my parents and friends and neighbors that there was a feeling of intense crisis, a feeling that maybe we were going to the brink of some kind of a nuclear confrontation. Let's rehearse the events in order and very quickly because we want to get to the more substantive questions.

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But, uh, and correct me if I'm wrong in this record. On October 16, President Kennedy was alerted by the intelligence community, the National Defense, Uh, Intelligence Committee at the Pentagon and the C I A. That U two reconnaissance planes had discovered the presence of missiles, apparently nuclear tipped missiles in Cuba offensive weapons and that they were being deployed in such a way as to threaten the United States.

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The president established a committee popularly called X com, for executive committee of the National Security Council. It involved the chiefs of most of the agencies that would be involved with international relations and defense. Uh, Bobby Kennedy played a leading role in the conduct of that committee, and over the course of days which followed, the committee argued what should be the proper response of the United States?

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And there were two alternatives that were discussed in the main where they're not right. I think you're you're thinking about the surgical airstrike versus the invasion, which were the two alternatives that were discussed immediately, along with the other option, of course, which was to do nothing but which was rather quickly dismissed in the discussions.

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Later, President Kennedy would say, if he had done nothing, he surely would have been impeached, Right? Well, I think importantly on the executive committee, one thing which is unique about the Cuban missile crisis is that three members of former administrations were privy to all of those discussions.

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Dean Acheson, John McCloy and Robert Lovett. Uh, clearly an effort on the part of the Kennedy administration to bring back leading figures from the Truman and Eisenhower years in an effort to create a bipartisan consensus on what we should do, and very quickly to the United States government made its photographs available for study to the Organization of American States and received the unanimous backing of O.

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A s in whatever the United States determined to do, which was quite extraordinary because instead of the US becoming an independent outlaw against the ordinary international conventions that prohibit one nation from attacking another. It really gave an extraordinary warrant to the United States to handle this problem.

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However, it's so fit and put the Soviet Union on the defensive immediately. Uh, there's another alternative that was proposed to the ones that you named the surgical strike the invasion and, uh, doing nothing. And that fourth option was put forward, I think, first by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

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Namely, that we establish a blockade right, the alternative that was ultimately accepted. It's interesting when you look back at the sources and you see that other than McNamara, no one initially believed that this would be the appropriate response on the part of the United States. And yet, ultimately, a consensus was reached in which virtually everyone, whether whether it was with some doubts or not, eventually went along with the decision to go for the blockade.

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As a Robert Kennedy puts it in his book, it was decided, uh, not immediately, but rather late in that period of 13 days that even a overall a massive air attack could not take out all of the missiles and that once we launch such an attack, some of those missiles would fire off and we would have nuclear explosions in the United States.

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And so that gave him the edge and deciding in favor of the blockade. Some had said, Well, if you establish a blockade that's not going to remove all the missiles. But now the Joint Chiefs of Staff were acknowledging that even if they had a mass air attack, that would not remove all of the missiles.

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Yeah, I think they're estimate was that it would take approximately 500 air strikes. Two. Be sure that 90% of all the missiles were destroyed and there were a lot of problems with the air strikes. Of course, there were approximately 20,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. The odds are very good that some of those some of those Soviet troops, were going to be casualties if there was an air strike.

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And what would the Russian response be to Soviet casualties in Cuba? Mm. So there was the question certainly in McNamara McNamara's mind and Bobby Kennedy's mind about whether this would be worth the risk. Mm. You know, the incredible thing to me, Bob, is that while we were arriving at that decision to establish a blockade.

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The Soviets continued to deny that they had placed any Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, as a matter of fact gave assurances directly to the contrary. A letter from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy assured the president there were no offensive weapons of any kind in Cuba of the Soviet ambassador.

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Dobrynin, whose is still the Soviet ambassador in Washington, assured Robert Kennedy that he had been told by Khrushchev to send a message to the president. There were no such weapons in Cuba and even while the photographic evidence was mounting in the White House, showing all of these missiles in place and rapidly being brought to a condition in which they could be launched, here comes the Soviet foreign minister himself, Andrei Gromyko, to pay a call on President Kennedy and to assure him that the Soviet Union has no intention of placing any such weapons in Cuba.

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Are you surprised by the brazenness of the deception? Well, it leads to the larger question of what we're Soviet motives. Throughout this whole affair, the Soviets have often acted duplicitous in international affairs, and maybe it shouldn't surprise us that they would deny this right up until the last minute.

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But the question that still has us puzzled much, as does the question of why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 which is hardly a settled issue. UH, is why did the Soviets put missiles in Cuba? What was to their advantage in doing so? Taking a risk?

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An extremely provocative risk, Which brought us, in the words of many, closer to the brink of nuclear catastrophe than ever before in the history of mankind. Why, what was in it for Khrushchev? Do you have an answer? I wish I had an answer. I'm aware of the theories, as I'm sure you are.

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Maybe we could discuss them a little, but I always wind up with questions, more questions and answers when I read material about the Cuban missile crisis at the time, according to Bobby Kennedy's 13 days, there were about five theories that were thrown around during the X com meetings as to what the Soviets were up to.

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And historians today and political scientists still toss around these same theories and maybe ads and new ones about what the Soviets were up to. Uh, the one that seems to make the most sense to me, and I don't find it entirely convincing. But it seems to make the most sense.

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And that is that the Soviets would achieve a relative gain in the strategic balance vis a vis the United States by adding offensive missiles in Cuba that were capable of striking the United States. Whether it was worth the risk is another question. Well, I'll give you my theory for what it's worth, and it is that the Soviets were modeling themselves after what we had done in Turkey, which abutted their borders.

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We had placed Jupiter missiles at the doorstep of the Soviet Union, and they probably felt that that gave them justification for doing the same just outside the borders of the United States and their client, their new client state, Cuba. And it's It's not only Turkey in which were ringing the Soviets at this time.

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We've got intelligence facilities in Pakistan on the Soviet border. We've got intelligence facilities, I believe in Iran at that time, although these matters are still classified, so it's hard to tell exactly what we were doing. We had missiles throughout Western Europe that were capable of hitting the Soviet Union in Italy, the Jupiter missiles as well as in Turkey, so the Soviets could well have felt encircled.

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But the question is, why 1962 and why Cuba and what what else is going on in the international situation that would lead Khrushchev to believe it worked to his advantage to put missiles in Cuba? Well, let's return to those Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey in a moment.

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But follow continue to follow now the events as they occurred and again, only an outline after some time near the completion of the 13 day period we established, the blockade 500 mile line is drawn outside the boundaries of Cuba. And, um, almost immediately, 20 Soviet ships, which are approaching that boundary line turned back.

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They turn aside and go back. But some others continue on their course, including a number of Soviet submarines. And it became an earnest question. Should we board those ships? Should they pass the 500 line embargo or blockade point. Finally, one ship was allowed through. I forget its name.

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The malarkey, Cormack Rx something of that order. It was an old US Liberty ship that was now sailing under the Soviet flag it was allowed to go through and then followed for a short distance. Um, and another ship was boarded and found to contain. Well, I believe it was that ship that was boarded and found to contain no no weapons, and then it passed right through and then passed on.

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But six Soviet submarines were harassed to the point in which they had to surface and identify themselves. That was a warlike action on the part of the United States. So it demonstrated that we meant business. And I suppose the Soviet Union then decided we had better respond to this action on the part of the United States.

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And so Khrushchev sent a message that was very emotional in character. And the long and the short of it was, as I recall, that he would dismantle and remove all of the nuclear weapons from Cuba, provided that the United States lifted the blockade and made a pledge not to invade Cuba.

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And while the X com members were reviewing that communication, another communication arrived, which seemed not to come from the hand of Khrushchev brought from his aides or his his defense people, which was far more strident and threatening and character and introduced a new element, saying, Provided you do this and as well removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

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So the ex con committee had to make a choice. And this is the famous incident in which Bobby Kennedy decides. Why don't we just ignore the first letter, the Friday letter. And, uh, excuse me? Why don't we ignore this Saturday letter the second letter and respond instead to the first letter?

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And this is the beginning of the settlement that comes out of the Cuban missile crisis and really the Jupiter missiles we had wanted to remove ourselves? Well, that's a fascinating thing about this whole crisis that the Soviets in there Saturday Communication had demanded that we removed missiles, which Kennedy a year previously had decided.

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We're so obsolete that should be removed. He had given and the New York order to his administration to have the missiles removed. It seems what happened was that Dean Rusk then met with the Turkish foreign minister, and the Turkish foreign minister very stridently argued that he didn't want the missiles removed, and Rusk decided to do nothing at the time.

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And as often happens in a large bureaucracy. The president had no idea what had happened, that these missiles hadn't been removed. And so he found themselves in a situation where missiles that he had already decided weren't essential to American national security were now part of the Soviet, uh, plea for some kind of a bargain.

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And yet he felt he couldn't remove them on a threat from the Soviet Union, which gets us into this whole question of appearances. Uh, this would have appeared to have been a very strong concession on the part of the United States to the Soviet Union. In fact, it wouldn't have been a real concession since we have already made a decision to get rid of these myths.

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But it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to argue to the world that we had already made that decision to remove them a year before, right. However, it seems that what did happen is that Bobby Kennedy, in a meeting with the Soviet advisor, was it to Brennan at the time, the ambassador.

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Yes, he had Brendan come to his office and the Attorney General's office. And according to his account during the discussion, uh, the Soviet ambassador was told by Bobby Kennedy that while it would, it wouldn't be inopportune for the United States to remove those missiles immediately. He assured them in the recent in the near future they would definitely be removed just to be kept confidential between the two superpowers.

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So exactly so this was a modus vivendi or the deal that was worked out. In effect, we had pledged not to invade Cuba. The Soviets pledged to remove the missiles from Cuba, subject to international supervision by a U. N. Team, and we had also agreed confidentially to remove our missiles from Jupiter.

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And while official communications were arriving from Moscow, an unofficial communication much the same character as the so called Friday letter came from a minor government official in New York to the hands of an ABC television correspondent named John Scalise. And this confirmed the Soviet view had the force of confirming the authenticity of the first letter, and it was on that basis that we struck the deal that you describe.

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Um, the Soviets then did, as they promised, they dismantle the weapons and under U. N supervision, uh, they were removed back to the Soviet Union. Now we have to ask some questions in the light of the crisis, What did we learn about Soviet behavior and what did we learn about US behavior?

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Let me turn to the latter question first, Bobby Kennedy says in his book 13 Days that if there was any great moment or a great theme that came out of the X com deliberations and the decisions of the president, it was the measured response that was made by the United States that the president did not act precipitously.

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The president acted upon the basis of thorough research and analysis on the part of his chief aides, and by choosing the blockade against the military alternatives of a surgical strike or an invasion. He did the most appropriate thing and was vindicated by the subsequent, uh, years of Soviet American relations.

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What is your opinion of Bobby Kennedy's analysis of his and his brother's decision in this matter? Well, I think it's a tough question because the Soviets did back down, so it's easy for him to argue in retrospect that we took the prudent action because we accomplished our objectives.

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However, John F. Kennedy himself estimated that at the height of the missile crisis. He thought the chances of our going to war over this issue were between 33% and 50% mhm. Now, other historians and political scientists have looked at this confrontation and said, Did it justify the chance of close to 50 50 going to nuclear war with the Soviet Union over missiles in Cuba?

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Which, in the words of Robert McNamara, didn't amount to a significant change in the overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union? That, to me is the toughest question. Kennedy and and his top aide, Ted Sorensen, both later said both later agreed that the reality, the objective reality of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was not at all significantly altered by the emplacement of missiles in Cuba.

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Yet the appearance of that strategic balance was altered. Now did we go to the brink of nuclear war on appearances? Mm. Others have argued, including Graham Allison, that while the United States itself was not endangered by Soviet missiles in Cuba, the administration of John F. Kennedy was endangered.

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Now that's a very different question. Did we go to the brink of nuclear war to save John Kennedy and his administration. Now the criticism is that the United States was not all that adversely affected by the presence of those missiles in Cuba that that did not substantially alter the balance of terror, so to speak.

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That's the argument made at the time by Robert McNamara and made afterwards by a number of other Kennedy AIDS, as well as some historians and defense specialists. This is because there already were intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union, which could have done the same damage right and that the United States still had an overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, McNamara said.

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A missile as a missile doesn't really matter whether you get hit by a missile from the Soviet Union or a missile from Cuba granted there 90 miles closer to the United States. But in overall strategic terms, does that make a significant difference to American national security?

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And while neither you or I are experts on this, we really have to differ, I think, to the opinion of others, the consensus seems to be that it wouldn't have made a very serious difference. But there was another kind of challenge kind of moral challenge, if you will, that we responded to.

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I think so. I think there was a feeling that American credibility was at stake. That's a very important concept here. Kennedy, remember in September, had been forced by congressional critics who had been arguing that he hadn't done enough about the Cuban menace to say that the United States would take a hard line on the emplacement of offensive missiles in Cuba.

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So he had already forced his hand really on this issue. Once the missiles were discovered, he would have had to back down from a statement he had already made publicly. Um, and Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana was arguing very strongly at the time in the Senate that we should launch an invasion without knowing that there were ballistic missiles.

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They're just on general principle that Cuba was arming itself with conventional weapons, right, and with that kind of spirit in the country, the president, you say, had to respond in a very affirmative way. Well, I think clearly he believed he had to respond and I think you got that from his brother's book 13 days.

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I think it's also important to keep in mind the Cuban context here. It really is difficult to talk about the Cuban missile crisis without talking about the Bay of Pigs disaster the previous year, which had been the gravest political defeat for Kennedy in his young administration.

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And I don't think he was ready to face a similar defeat. Bob, how close do you think we actually came to a nuclear catastrophe? I think we probably came closer than at any other point in the Postwar period. Whether it was as close as Kennedy himself estimated 33 to 50% I would doubt.

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But this is just a matter of guesswork, really, Mike. We have no way of knowing that I could. I could come up with scenarios which would give plausibility to the view that a gradual escalation could have led two nuclear confrontation here. Had Kennedy gone along with what the majority of his advisers recommended in the executive committee meetings, which was an airstrike to knock out the missiles, had a number of Soviet troops been killed in the process, I don't think it's implausible to think that the Soviets would have taken action against U.

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S missiles in Turkey, had the Soviets taken action against U. S missiles in Turkey. It's not implausible that we would have taken action against the basis from which those missiles in the Soviet Union were fired at Turkey. And here you have a scenario of rapid escalation that leads to nuclear Holocaust.

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It's not implausible. There was a casualty on our side, which many people have forgotten, I'm sure. And that is, uh, an Air Force major. Rudolf Anderson Jr of South Carolina, who's Who's U two, was shot down or it is believed it was shot down because President Kennedy asked that there be some confirmation of the actual fate of the craft.

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I, uh, Bobby Kennedy does not give us the final determination of what happened, but the supposition is that it was shot down. There was that one fatality. Bob. What about the measured response of President Kennedy that has come under criticism, too? Has it not only have a minute or so remaining, but I remember you're mentioning to me that there has been criticism that he though he acted in what might be called a measured or prudent way he may not have acted in the best way.

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Well, let me just read to you something briefly, very briefly from Richard Walton's very critical look at Kennedy's foreign policy, Wong says, I believe that his decision to go to the brink of nuclear war was irresponsible and reckless to a supreme degree, that it risked the kind of terrible miscalculation that Kennedy was always warning Khrushchev about, that it was unnecessary and that if one assumes minimum competence, the Kennedy administration knew it was not necessary.

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In short, Kennedy, without sufficient reason, consciously risk nuclear catastrophe with all that implied for the people not only of the United States and Russia but of the entire world. That's an extreme statement, perhaps, but given the perspective of 20 years, given the fact that we did come as close as Kennedy himself admitted to nuclear war over Cuba, it would be difficult not to take that kind of reasoning very seriously.

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Indeed, it is amazing that over the last 20 years there has been no additional provocation of that kind. One could argue, pragmatically, that the two Kennedys were proven right and the choices that they made one could argue that one could argue that we learned our lesson also that we came so close to the brink that we developed certain procedures such as the hotline.

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Yes, Um, well, which made it less likely that such a confrontation would occur in the future. So one good thing at least came out of the entire confrontation. I think some good things came out. Sure, Bob, thank you very much for being with me to talk about the Cuban missile crisis of 20 years ago on conversation, like my pleasure.

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Thank you. What mhm.